The Three Models of Emotional Intelligence and Performance in a Hot and Cool go/no-go Task in Undergraduate Students by Gutiérrez-Cobo, María José et al.
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
published: 22 February 2017
doi: 10.3389/fnbeh.2017.00033
The Three Models of Emotional
Intelligence and Performance in a
Hot and Cool go/no-go Task in
Undergraduate Students
María J. Gutiérrez-Cobo1, Rosario Cabello2 and Pablo Fernández-Berrocal1*
1Department of Basic Psychology, Faculty of Psychology, University of Málaga, Málaga, Spain, 2Department
of Developmental and Educational Psychology, University of Granada, Granada, Spain
Edited by:
Nuno Sousa,




University of Miami, USA
Luísa Faria,




Received: 01 September 2016
Accepted: 10 February 2017
Published: 22 February 2017
Citation:
Gutiérrez-Cobo MJ, Cabello R and
Fernández-Berrocal P (2017) The
Three Models of Emotional
Intelligence and Performance in a Hot
and Cool go/no-go Task in
Undergraduate Students.
Front. Behav. Neurosci. 11:33.
doi: 10.3389/fnbeh.2017.00033
Emotional intelligence (EI), or the ability to perceive, use, understand and regulate
emotions, appears to be helpful in the performance of “hot” (i.e., emotionally laden)
cognitive tasks when using performance-based ability models, but not when using
self-report EI models. The aim of this study is to analyze the relationship between EI
(as measured through a performance-based ability test, a self-report mixed test and a
self-report ability test) and cognitive control ability during the performance of hot and
“cool” (i.e., non-emotionally laden) “go/no-go” tasks. An experimental design was used
for this study in which 187 undergraduate students (25% men) with a mean age of
21.93 years (standard deviation [SD] = 3.8) completed the three EI tests of interest
(Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test [MSCEIT], Trait Meta-Mood Scale
[TMMS] and Emotional Quotient Inventory–Short Form [EQi:S]) as well as go/no-go
tasks using faces and geometric figures as stimuli. The results provide evidence for
negative associations between the “managing” branch of EI measured through the
performance-based ability test of EI and the cognitive control index of the hot go/no-
go task, although similar evidence was not found when using the cool task. Further,
the present study failed to observe consistent results when using the self-report EI
instruments. These findings are discussed in terms of both the validity and implications
of the various EI models.
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INTRODUCTION
For centuries, emotion and cognition were understood as separate concepts. Whilst emotion
was traditionally regarded as a primitive mechanism, cognition, on the other hand, was
viewed as the more complex aspect of the human psyche (Ekman and Davidson, 1994).
Today, however, the notion of an interactive and bidirectional relationship between both
constructs has gained wide acceptance. Neuroscientists have revealed complex interactions
between the two processes, demonstrating a high level of interdependence between them
(Phelps et al., 2014). Thus, emotions and cognitive processes such as attention, decision
making and memory (among others) appear to be related (Lerner et al., 2015). For instance,
a negative emotional state will promote more systematic, detailed and careful processing
of information, while a positive emotional state will lead to a less systematic (but more
creative and spontaneous) processing style (Bless et al., 1990; Schwarz and Bless, 1991).
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 1 February 2017 | Volume 11 | Article 33
Gutiérrez-Cobo et al. Emotional Intelligence and Cognitive Control
One construct that attempts to connect the concepts of
emotion and cognition is what is known as ‘‘emotional
intelligence’’ (EI). Mayer and Salovey (1997; p. 10), have
provided perhaps themost relevant approach to this concept, and
define it as
. . . the ability to perceive accurately, appraise and express
emotion; the ability to access and/or generate feelings when
they facilitate thought; the ability to understand emotion and
emotional knowledge; and the ability to regulate emotions to
promote emotional and intellectual growth.
Since its introduction by Salovey and Mayer (1990), EI
has been the subject of much empirical work. However,
this growing interest has both advantages and disadvantages.
One advantage is the enormous resources that investigators
have invested in studying the concept, which has led to vast
amounts of models, instruments and investigations. However,
this research has not always been conducted in a systematic
and rigorous scientific manner, which has hindered progress in
the conceptualization of the construct (Mayer et al., 2008b). In
an attempt to organize the EI literature, Joseph and Newman
(2010) proposed three models, which can be distinguished
according to the type of measuring instruments that have been
employed.
In the first, the performance-based ability model, EI is
viewed as a form of intelligence that is based on emotional
aptitudes, and is regarded as a mental ability that involves
reasoning about our emotions, which is focused on hot
information processing (Mayer et al., 2016). Within this
framework, EI is evaluated by solving emotional problems
through performance tests that include a set of correct and
incorrect responses. The most representative instrument of this
model is the ‘‘Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence
Test’’ (MSCEIT; Mayer et al., 2002). The second model is
the self-report ability model, which, like the performance-
based ability model, views EI as a combination of emotional
aptitudes; in this case, however, self-report instruments are
used, where participants must estimate their own EI in a
subjective manner (Fernández-Berrocal and Extremera, 2008).
Thus, there are no correct and incorrect responses in the
self-report ability model, the ‘‘Trait Meta-Mood Scale’’ (TMMS;
Salovey et al., 1995) being a widely used instrument for this
approach. Finally, the self-report mixed model does not consider
EI to be a form of intelligence but instead views it as a broad
concept that includes (among others) motivations, interpersonal
and intrapersonal abilities, empathy, personality factors and
well-being (Mayer et al., 2008a). Again, this model employs
self-report instruments that evaluate the subjective perception
of the participants; the ‘‘Bar-On Emotional Quotient Inventory’’
(EQi)—named after its creator, Bar-On (2004)—is a commonly
employed test for this model. However, some researchers have
questioned the self-report mixed model, arguing that it is
unhelpful to conceptualize EI in terms of old (and already
studied) concepts, since such an approach fails to provide
any new information (Locke, 2005). In addition, although
the three models essentially assess the same construct, any
correlations between them appear to be weak (Goldenberg
et al., 2006; Webb et al., 2013; Cabello and Fernández-Berrocal,
2015a).
Despite the differences between these models, their use
has yielded a large number of EI-related outcomes. Thus,
researchers have linked higher EI scores to better mental and
physical health (Schutte et al., 2007; Martins et al., 2010;
Zeidner et al., 2012), well-being and happiness (Cabello and
Fernández-Berrocal, 2015b; Sánchez-Álvarez et al., 2015), job
performance (Côté, 2014), prosocial behavior (Mavroveli et al.,
2009), less aggressive behavior (García-Sancho et al., 2014), and
substance abuse (Kun and Demetrovics, 2010). One relationship
that researchers have not examined in great detail, however, is
that between EI and cognitive processes. One question that arises
in this context is whether individuals with higher EI will perform
better on cognitive tasks.
In order to explore this relationship, Gutiérrez-Cobo
et al. (2016) recently conducted a systematic review of the
literature. The authors divided the 26 studies they found
into two categories: EI instruments (performance-based ability
test, self-report ability test and self-report mixed test) and
cognitive processes (‘‘hot’’ or emotionally laden vs. ‘‘cool’’ or
non-emotionally laden). The authors found that performance-
based ability EI (but not the self-report EI test) was positively
correlated with efficiency in hot cognitive tasks, but not
cool cognitive tasks, which suggests that higher EI could
indicate cognitive efficiency, depending on the emotional
content. However, Gutiérrez-Cobo et al. (2016) have pointed
out that these results were inconclusive for several reasons.
The first of these relates to the vast number of different
EI instruments employed (a total of 13 scales) as well as
the large variability in cognitive tasks (a total of 18 tasks)
that were used. Second the studies included a range of
cognitive processes (attention, memory, decision making, etc.)
that could have been influenced by the EI construct in
different ways. Finally, only a few studies have analyzed
cool cognitive tasks, making it difficult to draw any firm
conclusions.
On the basis of the limitations highlighted by Gutiérrez-
Cobo et al. (2016), the aim of the present study was to evaluate
the relationship between EI using the three models discussed
above and a specific hot and cool cognitive capacity known
as ‘‘cognitive control ability’’. Cognitive control describes a
heterogeneous construct that allows the representation and
attainment of goal-directed behaviors as well as the detection
and resolution of conflicts in information processing (Miller
and Cohen, 2001). This ability is fundamental to people’s
daily activities, and it allows for flexibility in their behavior.
Deficits in cognitive control could, for instance, lead to
problems related to impulsiveness, drug abuse, or caffeine
over-consumption (Aichert et al., 2012; Volkow et al., 2013;
Holmes et al., 2016). In addition, EI has been shown to be
a beneficial moderator during stressful situations as well as
a protective factor for these risky behaviors, in which a lack
of cognitive control plays a key role (Slaski and Cartwright,
2003; Casey et al., 2011; Schneider et al., 2013; Extremera
and Rey, 2015; Limonero et al., 2015; Peña-Sarrionandia et al.,
2015).
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Cognitive control is not a unitary neurocognitive construct.
It consists of two different processes: interference control
and motor response inhibition. When discussing interference
control, we refer to the ability to prevent attentional interference
due to competition between relevant and irrelevant stimuli (Nigg,
2000). Motor response inhibition includes the ability to restrain
a strong response or cancel an ongoing response (Schachar
et al., 2007). Given this heterogeneity, a large number of tasks
are used to measure cognitive control ability, including the
Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), the stop-signal task (Logan et al.,
1984), and the go/no-go task (Van der Meere et al., 1995).
Whilst these tasks all inhibit the processing of an inadequate
‘‘prepotent’’ response, they involve quite different mechanisms.
In particular, the latter two measures are part of the motor
response inhibition construct, whilst the Stroop task measures
interference control. In a typical Stroop task, participants must
indicate the color of a given word in which the word and the
color are incompatible—for instance, the word ‘‘red’’ written
in blue ink. The subject’s reaction time (RT) will be longer
when the color and word are incongruent than when they are
not (for example, the word ‘‘red’’ written in red ink). Since
the introduction of the original Stroop task, researchers have
developed numerous versions, including those that utilize a large
variety of stimuli. Few studies have evaluated the relationship
between EI and Stroop tasks. For instance, Coffey et al. (2003),
using a self-report ability model instrument, reported longer
RTs for participants who exhibited higher levels of attention
to feeling, whilst Martin and Thomas (2011) and Checa and
Fernández-Berrocal (2015) both found a negative correlation
between a performance-based ability model instrument and an
RT index of the Stroop task.
Our first objective in the present study is to evaluate the
relationship between EI and cognitive control abilities using a
task that is more centered on the motor aspect of cognitive
control, namely the go/no-go task. This procedure evaluates
the ability to withhold a prepotent response, and to the best
of our knowledge, no studies have yet used this paradigm to
analyze the relationship between EI and cognitive control. We
selected the go/no-go task given that it shows reliable and
robust results (Casey et al., 1997). Our second aim is to assess
whether or not this relationship depends on the emotional
content of the task by using cool and hot go/no-go tasks
(Schulz et al., 2007). Finally, we wanted to determine which EI
model is the most predictive of this cognitive process by using
three EI instruments: the performance-based ability model, the
self-report ability model and the self-report mixed model. We
hypothesize that individuals with a high level of development
of the EI construct—measured via a performance-based ability
model instrument but without self-report measures—will display
higher cognitive control abilities in the emotional task. In
other words, by using this performance instrument, we expect
to find a lower false alarm (FA) rate in the hot go/no-go
task.
These results are to be expected due to the nature of the
EI performance instruments, which use objective measures
that are the equivalent of the cognitive control task, and
as such, participants cannot falsify their responses. Through
self-reports, however, participants give their subjective opinion
about the status of their EI and, therefore, such responses
may be inaccurate. Our current hypothesis is also based on
the results of previous research (Gutiérrez-Cobo et al., 2016).
In particular, neuroscience studies have demonstrated that the
same frontal regions of the brain are involved in both cognitive
control and the processing related to the performance-based
ability model (Miller, 2000; Jausovec et al., 2001; Ridderinkhof
et al., 2004; Rushworth et al., 2004; Krueger et al., 2009;
Tang et al., 2016). Finally, due to the emotional nature of
the cognitive task (both hot and cool), we expect that EI will
be related to the hot cognitive task but not to the cool task.
As Gutiérrez-Cobo et al. (2016) have found, it appears that
the beneficial effect of EI depends on emotional content. This
result is also compatible with the various definitions of the EI
concept, which is understood to be a form of intelligence that
helps individuals to cope with both their own emotions and




The sample consisted of 199 psychology undergraduates from
the University of Málaga, Spain (25% men), ranging in
age from 19 to 48 years (M = 21.87, standard deviation
[SD] = 3.82). Due to the cut-off employed, the final sample
was composed of 187 participants. Inclusion criteria were the
absence of any motor or visual disability and mental retardation.
They took part in the experiment in exchange for course
credits. The study was carried out in accordance with the
Declaration of Helsinki and ethical guidelines of the American
Psychological Association, and all participants provided written
informed consent. The Research Ethics Committee of the
University of Málaga approved the study protocol as part of
the projects SEJ-07325 and PSI2012-37490. The experiment
was carried out in three different stages. First, the participants
completed the MSCEIT in a collective classroom environment.
Second, they completed the TMMS and Emotional Quotient
Inventory–Short Form (EQi:S) online (from the final sample,
seven and nine participants did not complete the TMMS and
EQi-S, respectively). The two types of administration of the
EI instruments did not affect their reliability (see Table 1).
Finally, the participants performed the two cognitive tasks in
a quiet room using one of ten semi-isolated computers. Both
cognitive tasks were programmed using the software E-prime 2.0.
Each participant was assigned a number in order to maintain
anonymity.
EI Instruments
Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT
v. 2.0; Mayer et al., 2002; Extremera and Fernández-Berrocal,
2009). For the performance-based ability model, we employed
the Spanish translation of the MSCEIT, which shows
psychometric properties similar to the original English-language
instrument (Extremera et al., 2006). This test has been validated
for adults aged 17 and above. The MSCEIT is a 141-item test that
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TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics of the emotional intelligence (EI) instruments.
Mean Min. Max. SD Median Asymmetry Kurtosis α
MSCEIT
Total 108.98 86.49 124.38 8.21 110.63 −0.69 −0.02 0.82
Perceiving emotions 108.76 56.33 122.29 10.89 111.33 −1.80 5.01 0.78
Facilitating emotions 101.94 65.71 119.50 9.72 103.50 −1.06 1.50 0.72
Understanding emotions 108.44 69.73 127.00 9.79 110.56 −1.24 1.79 0.76
Managing emotions 109.33 71.91 124.20 10.81 111.64 −1.04 0.96 0.78
TMMS
Attention to feeling 3.52 1.00 5.00 0.54 3.63 −0.57 0.22 0.90
Clarity of feeling 3.41 1.00 5.00 0.74 3.50 −0.33 0.12 0.85
Mood repair 3.45 1.50 5.00 0.71 3.50 −0.30 0.03 0.85
EQi:S
Interpersonal 4.22 2.29 5.00 0.44 4.29 −0.63 1.46 0.78
Adaptability 3.82 1.20 5.00 0.67 3.80 −0.52 0.74 0.82
Stress management 3.32 1.13 4.88 0.85 3.38 −0.26 −0.51 0.87
Intrapersonal 3.68 1.50 5.00 0.69 3.75 −0.42 −0.02 0.81
measures the four branches of the EI definitions proposed by
Mayer and Salovey (1997): perceiving, facilitating, understanding
and managing emotions. This instrument uses two tasks to
measure each of the four branches of EI, comprising a total of
eight tasks. An example of an item related to the facilitating
branch is ‘‘What mood (s) might be helpful to feel when meeting
in-laws for the very first time?’’ Here, participants have to
choose, on a scale from 1 (not useful) to 5 (useful), how different
emotions such as tension, surprise and joy would favor this
situation. The instrument provides separate scores for each
branch as well as an overall score for total EI. Scores can be
calculated based on expert or consensus norms, which tend
to correlate strongly with each other (r > 0.90; Mayer et al.,
2003). Scores computed by the test publishers are standardized
(M = 100, SD = 15); the reliability of the two halves is 0.93, based
on the consensus criterion. The test-retest reliability of the global
MSCEIT is 0.86 after 3 weeks (Brackett and Mayer, 2003). In the
present study, we used consensus norms to calculate the scores
for total EI ability as well as for each of the four branches. For the
scales that were used in the present study, internal consistency
ranged from 0.72 to 0.82 (perceiving = 0.78, facilitating = 0.72,
understanding = 0.76, managing = 0.78 and total EI = 0.82). This
consistency was measured as the Cronbach’s alpha (α) in the
case of total EI score and as two-halves consistency in the case of
the remaining scores.
Trait Meta-Mood Scale (TMMS; Salovey et al., 1995;
Fernández-Berrocal et al., 2004). For the self-report abilitymodel,
we employed the Spanish translation of the TMMS (Fernández-
Berrocal et al., 2004). This is a 24-item test that has been
validated in a university student population, and measures
individuals’ beliefs on three dimensions: attention, clarity and
repair (Fernández-Berrocal and Extremera, 2008). An item
example is ‘‘I don’t pay too much attention to my feelings’’ and
participants have to respond on a Likert-scale from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). In our study, we found good
reliability for the three dimensions: a Cronbach’s α of 0.90 for
attention and clarity and 0.85 for repair.
Emotional Quotient Inventory–Short Form (EQi:S; Parker
et al., 2011; López-Zafra et al., 2014). For the self-report mixed
model, we employed the Spanish translation of the EQi:S (EQi:C;
López-Zafra et al., 2014). This test has also been validated
in a university student population. The EQi:S is a 28-item
test that measures four dimensions of traits and self-concepts:
intrapersonal, interpersonal, adaptability and stress management.
Participants respond using a five-point Likert-type scale from
1 (never) to 5 (always) to statements such as ‘‘I like to help
people’’. The instrument provides a score for each dimension.
The reliability for the four scores ranged from moderate to high:
intrapersonal (α = 0.73), interpersonal (α = 0.78), adaptability
(α = 0.70) and stress management (α = 0.75). In our study,
we found an acceptable level of reliability for the interpersonal
scale (α = 0.70) and a good level of reliability for adaptability




This task was adapted from the work of Tottenham et al. (2011).
The set of stimuli was composed of gray scale images of adult
females and males with five different expressions: angry, fearful,
happy, sad and neutral (Ekman and Friesen, 1976). In this
task (Figure 1), the participants pressed a button when a ‘‘go’’
stimulus (one of the five facial expressions) appeared on the
screen, and they had to contain their responses when a ‘‘no-go’’
stimulus (a different facial expression) was presented. During
each block, the participants were informed that a certain facial
expression (e.g., an angry face) was the go stimulus. Participants
conducted this task across a total of eight counter-balanced
blocks: for four of the blocks, the go stimulus was always a given
emotional expression (e.g., happy), while the no-go stimulus was
a neutral expression. For the remaining four blocks, this pattern
was reversed: the go stimulus was always a neutral face, while the
no-go stimulus was a specific emotional expression (e.g., a fearful
face). In addition, each block consisted of 30 trials in which
the go stimuli occurred more frequently (70%) than the no-go
stimuli (30%), which helped to create a tendency to respond
to the go stimuli. During each trial, the stimuli appeared for
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 4 February 2017 | Volume 11 | Article 33
Gutiérrez-Cobo et al. Emotional Intelligence and Cognitive Control
FIGURE 1 | Hot go/no-go task design.
500 ms, with 1000 ms between trials during which participants
could respond. Finally, before the task began, the participants
completed a practice phase to familiarize themselves with the
task.
Cool go/no-go Task
This task was performed in the same way as the hot go/no-
go task but with neutral stimuli (Figure 2). The set of stimuli
was composed of green and red circles. Only one block of
120 trials was conducted, and again, the go stimuli appearedmore
frequently (70%) than the no-go stimuli (30%).
Data Analyses
All statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS 22.0 (IBM,
Armonk, NY, USA). Those participants with total MSCEIT
scores below 85 were removed from the analyses given that it
indicates a misunderstanding of the task or an emotional deficit
(Extremera et al., 2006). Preliminary analyses were carried to
compute the EI descriptive statistics and the correlations among
EI instruments (see ‘‘Emotional Intelligence’’ Section). In order
to analyze the cool and hot cognitive tasks, we calculated RT, FA
and d-prime indices. Participants with a total number of errors
that were more than 2 SDs from the mean on each cognitive
task were removed from the study (Luque et al., 2016). RT was
calculated only for correct trials and trials with no more than
±3 SDs from the mean of each participant (Tottenham et al.,
2011) in our sample. FA rates served as the measure of cognitive
control; they were calculated as the percentage of responses that
were given on the no-go trials. Finally, the d-prime measure
provided a discrimination index and, following Tottenham et al.
(2011), was obtained by subtracting the z-transformed FA rate
from the z-transformed hit rate. We first conducted a within-
subject ANOVA using emotion (angry, fearful, happy, sad) and
stimulus type (emotion as ‘‘go’’ or ‘‘no-go’’) for the RT, FA
and d-prime indices (without including EI) to fully capture
the effect of each condition (see ‘‘Hot go/no-go Task’’ Section)
as well as post hoc t-test comparisons between emotions and
stimulus type applying Bonferroni corrections, setting statistical
significance at p < 0.006 (0.05/8). We then made bivariate
correlations between the three EI variables and each of the
hot go/no-go indices (see ‘‘Correlations’’ Section). In addition,
in order to clarify the various correlations found, multiple
regression analyses were used to test if the dimensions of the
MSCEIT, TMMS and EQi-S significantly predicted participants’
total index of RT, FA and d-prime (see ‘‘Multiple Regressions’’
FIGURE 2 | Cool go/no-go task design.
Section). Afterwards, bivariate correlations were conducted
between the EI variables and the cool go/no-go RT, FA and
d-prime indices (see ‘‘Cool go/no-go Task and EI’’ Section).
Finally (see ‘‘Cool and Hot go/no-go Task’’ Section), in order
to find any similarities between tasks, bivariate correlations
and t-test comparisons were carried out between the cool and




We first conducted descriptive analyses of the three EI
instruments (Table 1). Correlations between the three
EI instruments were also examined (Table 2), and these
analyses revealed a positive and significant correlation between
the management branch of the MSCEIT with the EQi-S
intrapersonal scale (r = 0.15, p = 0.048) as well as the clarity
(r = 0.16, p = 0.04) and repair (r = 0.19, p = 0.01) TMMS
scales. The attention scale of the TMMS correlated positively
with the interpersonal (r = 0.42, p < 0.01) and adaptability
(r = 0.25, p = 0.002) scales of the EQi-S but negatively
with the stress management scale (r = −0.20, p = 0.009). In
addition, the TMMS clarity scale correlated positively with
the EQi-S interpersonal (r = 0.24, p = 0.001), adaptability
(r = 0.35, p < 0.01), stress management (r = 0.26, p < 0.01),
and intrapersonal (r = 0.59, p < 0.01) scales. Finally, the
repair scale of the TMMS correlated positively with the
interpersonal (r = 0.32, p < 0.01), adaptability (r = 0.35,
p < 0.01), and intrapersonal (r = 0.38, p < 0.01) scales of the
EQi-S.
Hot go/no-go Task
A within-subject ANOVA was then conducted using the factors
of emotion (angry, fearful, happy, sad) and stimulus type
(emotion as ‘‘go’’ or ‘‘no-go’’) for the RT, FA and d-prime
variables. For RT (Figure 3), the ANOVA yielded a significant
main effect of emotion (F(3,531) = 33.66, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.16),
a main effect of stimulus type (F(1,177) = 40.37, p < 0.01,
η2p = 0.19), and a significant interaction between emotion and
stimulus type (F(3,531)= 24.84, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.12). Using
Bonferroni correction, RTs were fastest for happy stimuli (mean
[SD]: 421.35 [6.49]; p (relative to angry) < 0.01; p (relative to
fearful)< 0.01; p (relative to sad)< 0.01), followed by sad (mean
[SD]: 440.25 [6.53]; p (relative to angry) = 0.71; p (relative to
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TABLE 2 | Pearson correlations among the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso emotional intelligence test (MSCEIT), trait meta-mood scale (TMMS), and emotional
quotient inventory–short form (EQi-S) sub-scales.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
MSCEIT
1. Total
2. Perceiving emotions 0.72∗∗
3. Facilitating emotions 0.70∗∗ 0.42∗∗
4. Understanding emotions 0.60∗∗ 0.13 0.27∗∗
5. Managing emotions 0.49∗∗ 0.03 0.16∗ 0.23∗∗
TMMS
6. Attention to feeling 0.01 −0.09 0.02 0.02 0.12
7. Clarity of feeling 0.03 −0.10 0.04 0.05 0.16∗ 0.24∗∗
8. Mood repair 0.12 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.19∗ 0.02 0.46∗∗
EQi:S
9. Interpersonal 0.11 0.08 0.11 −0.01 0.12 0.42∗∗ 0.24∗∗ 0.32∗∗
10. Adaptability 0.05 −0.02 0.00 0.07 0.10 0.23∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 0.22∗∗
11. Stress management 0.11 0.04 0.11 0.06 0.09 −0.20∗∗ 0.26∗∗ 0.12 −0.06 0.20∗∗
12. Intrapersonal 0.10 0.01 0.12 0.03 0.15∗ −0.04 0.59∗∗ 0.38∗∗ 0.24 0.29∗∗ 0.38∗∗
∗p = 0.005. ∗∗p = 0.001. 1 = MSCEIT total; 2 = Perceiving emotions MSCEIT; 3 = Facilitating emotions MSCEIT; 4 = Understanding emotions MSCEIT; 5 = Managing
emotions MSCEIT; 6 = Attention to feeling TMMS; 7 = Clarity of feeling TMMS; 8 = Mood repair TMMS; 9 = Interpersonal EQi:S; 10 = Adaptability EQi:S; 11 = Stress
management EQi:S; 12 = Intrapersonal EQi:S.
fearful) < 0.01) and angry (mean [SD]: 446.06 [6.15]; p (relative
to fearful) = 0.01) faces; finally, fearful faces showed the slowest
RTs (mean [SD]: 458.38 [7.33]). In addition, the participants
were faster in responding to the go stimuli when the stimuli
were neutral faces (mean [SD]: 430.80 [6.47]) than when they
were emotional expressions (mean [SD]: 452.22 [6.43]; p< 0.01).
In order to analyze the interaction, we carried out post hoc
t-tests for each emotion to search for differences due to stimulus
type. These analyses showed that RTs were longest when sad
(t(185) = 2.09, p = 0.04) and happy (t(182) = 10.67, p < 0.01)
faces were the go stimuli. No differences were found for angry
(t(185) = 0.68, p = 0.50) and fearful (t(183) = 1.34, p = 0.18)
faces.
For FA rates (Figure 4), the ANOVA again showed a
significant main effect of emotion (F(3,558) = 67.14, p < 0.01,
η2p = 0.27) and stimulus type (F(1,186) = 147.37, p < 0.01,
η2p = 0.44) as well as a significant emotion × stimulus type
interaction (F(3,558) = 3.89, p = 0.006, η2p = 0.02). Using
Bonferroni correction, FA scores were also higher for fearful
stimuli (mean [SD]: 21.50 [0.99]; p (relative to angry) < 0.01;
p (relative to happy) < 0.1; p (relative to sad) < 0.01), followed
by angry (mean [SD]: 14.81 [0.86]; p (relative to happy) < 0.01;
p (relative to sad) < 0.01) and sad (mean [SD]: 10.96 [0.70];
p (relative to happy) = 0.04) stimuli; happy stimuli showed
FIGURE 3 | Reaction time (RT) go/no-go task.
the lowest FA rates (mean [SD]: 8.61 [0.60]). Moreover, the
participants exhibited higher FAs for neutral no-go stimuli
(mean [SD]: 17.97 [0.72]) than for emotional no-go stimuli
(mean [SD]: 9.97 [0.52]; p < 0.01). In order to further explore
the source of the interaction between emotion and stimulus
type, we carried out post hoc t-tests for each emotion to analyze
differences between stimulus types. These analyses revealed that
FA rates were always higher when an emotional face was the
go stimulus (angry: t(186) = 7.45, p < 0.01; fearful: t(186) = 5.70,
p < 0.01; happy: t(186) = 5.16, p < 0.01; sad: t(186) = 6.12,
p< 0.01).
For d-prime scores (Figure 5), we again found a significant
main effect of emotion (F(3,558) = 83.60, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.31)
and stimulus type (F(1,186) = 150.13, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.45)
as well as a significant emotion × stimulus type interaction
(F(3,558) = 6.49, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.03). Using Bonferroni
correction, the d-prime scores were again higher for happy
(mean [SD]: 4.15 [0.09]; p (relative to angry) < 0.01; p (relative
to fearful) < 0.01; p (relative to sad) = 0.44), sad (mean
[SD]: 3.93 [0.10]; p (relative to angry) < 0.01; p (relative to
fearful) < 0.01), and angry (mean [SD]: 3.41 [0.10]; p (relative
to fearful) < 0.01) stimuli; fearful stimuli again showed the
lowest d-prime scores (mean [SD]: 2.45 [0.08]). In addition,
the participants showed better discrimination of neutral go
stimuli (mean [SD]: 4.03 [0.07]) than emotional go stimuli
FIGURE 4 | False alarm (FA) go/no-go task.
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FIGURE 5 | D-prime hot go/no-go task.
(mean [SD]: 2.94 [0.08]; p < 0.01). Post hoc t-tests for each
emotion on each stimulus type condition were conducted to
further analyze the interaction. They showed that the d-prime
scores were always higher when an emotional face was the no-go
stimulus (angry: t(186) = −4.82, p < 0.01; fearful: t(186) = −4.84,
p < 0.01; happy: t(186) = −7.22, p < 0.01; sad: t(186) = −9.09,
p< 0.01).
Hot go/no-go Tasks and EI
Correlations
MSCEIT
For RTs, we found significant and positive correlations between
the managing branch and the total RT (r = 0.19, p = 0.001),
the conditions in which the go stimulus was an emotional face
(r = 0.18, p = 0.02) or a neutral face (r = 0.19, p = 0.01). When
we focused on the type of emotion, we found that participants
with higher scores for the managing branch showed longer RTs
when the go stimuli were angry (r = 0.15, p = 0.04) and sad faces
(r = 0.19, p = 0.01); this was also the case when the go stimulus
was a neutral face and the no-go stimuli were angry (r = 0.17,
p = 0.02), fearful (r = 0.17, p = 0.02), happy (r = 0.17, p = 0.02), or
sad (r = 0.17, p = 0.02) faces.
For the FA, we found significant and negative correlations
between the percentage of total FAs and the managing branch
(r = −0.18, p = 0.02) and the total MSCEIT score (r = −0.15,
p = 0.045). In addition, the participants with higher scores on
the managing branch demonstrated lower FAs when the no-go
stimuli were emotional (r = −0.15, p = 0.04) and neutral faces
(r = −0.15, p = 0.04). When we focused on the kind of emotion
that was presented, for those conditions in which the go stimuli
were angry and happy faces, FA rates negatively and significantly
correlated with the total scores (r = −0.19, p = 0.01; r = −0.15,
p = 0.04, respectively) and the managing branch (r = −0.20,
p = 0.01; r = −0.22, p = 0.002, respectively). We also found
negative and significant correlations between the FA scores when
the no-go stimulus was an angry face and the branch was
managing (r = −0.14, p = 0.049); when the no-go stimulus was
a happy face and the branches were understanding (r = −0.18,
p = 0.01) andmanaging (r =−0.18, p = 0.02); and when the no-go
stimulus was a sad face and the branch was perceiving (r =−0.15,
p = 0.047).
For the d-prime, we found significant and positive
correlations between total d-prime scores and the perceiving
(r = 0.18, p = 0.02) and managing (r = 0.17, p = 0.02) branches
and total MSCEIT scores (r = 0.20, p = 0.01). We also observed
a significant and positive correlation between total EI scores
and d-prime scores when the go stimulus was an emotional
face (r = 0.17, p = 0.02). When we examined the type of
emotion presented, when the go stimulus was an angry face,
participants who scored higher on the managing branch tended
to discriminate better than those who scored lower on this
branch (r = −0.16, p = 0.03); the same outcome was obtained
when the no-go stimulus was an angry face, but with the total
score of the MSCEIT (r = −0.15, p = 0.04).
TMMS
For RTs, we found negative correlations approaching
significance between the ‘‘repair’’ scale and the conditions
in which the go stimulus was a neutral face (r = −0.14, p = 0.05).
For the type of emotion, we found that participants with higher
scores on the repair scale exhibited shorter RTs when the go
stimulus was an angry face (r = −0.16, p = 0.03) and when the
no-go stimulus was a sad face (r = −0.18, p = 0.02). For FA
scores, we only achieved a significant and positive correlation
between FAs when the go stimulus was a sad face and the scale
was ‘‘attention’’ (r = 0.17, p = 0.02). For the d-prime, we again
found only a significant and negative correlation between the
d-prime score when the no-go stimulus was an angry face and
the scale used was attention (r = −0.19, p = 0.01).
EQi-S
For RTs, we found a significant and negative correlation between
the interpersonal scale and the conditions in which the go stimuli
were emotional faces (r = −0.15, p = 0.04). When we focused
on each emotion, we found that those participants who scored
higher on the interpersonal scale had faster responses when
the go stimuli were angry (r = −0.18, p = 0.02) and sad faces
(r = −0.16, p = 0.04), while we found a positive correlation
between the ‘‘stress management’’ scale and RTs when the go
stimulus was a sad face (r = 0.16, p = 0.03). For the FA, we
only found a significant correlation when focusing on particular
emotions. Thus, these analyses revealed a negative correlation
between the stress management scale and the conditions in which
the go stimuli were happy (r = −0.15, p = 0.04) and sad faces
(r = −0.19, p = 0.01) as well as when the no-go stimulus was
a fearful face (r = −0.18, p = 0.02). For the d-prime, we again
found only significant and positive correlations if we focused on
the specific emotions. In particular, when the no-go stimulus was
a fearful expression, participants with higher scores on the stress
management (r = 0.19, p = 0.01) and intrapersonal (r = 0.17,
p = 0.02) scales showed better discriminative performance
than those with lower scores on those scales, as well as
those with higher scores on the ‘‘adaptability’’ scale for the
condition in which the no-go stimulus was a sad face (r = 0.19,
p = 0.02).
Multiple Regressions
In order to clarify the various correlations found, multiple
regression analyses were used to test if the dimensions of the
MSCEIT, TMMS and EQi-S significantly predicted participants’
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total index of RT, FA and d-prime. Prior to conducting this
statistic analyses, relevant assumptions were tested. Specifically,
assumption of multicollinearity was met as the tolerance and
variance inflation factor (VIF) statistics were all within accepted
limits. The assumption of singularity was also met as the EI
variables do not reveal being highly correlated (see Table 2).
Finally, the assumptions of independence measured with the
Durbin-Watson statistic was also satisfied.
The results for the RT index indicated that there were two
predictors: the management branch of the MSCEIT and the
repair scale of the TMMS. These predictors explained 5% of
the variance (adjusted R2 = 0.05, F(2,174) = 5.52, p = 0.005). It
was found that participants with higher scores on the managing
branch showed longer RTs (β = 0.21, p = 0.006), while the
opposite was found for the repair scale of the TMMS (β = −0.17,
p = 0.02). The other EI index scores showed no significant
association with RTs.
The results for the FA index indicated that the MSCEIT
management branch was the only predictor. This predictor
explained 2% of the variance (adjusted R2 = 0.02, F(1,175) = 5.29,
p = 0.02). In particular, higher scores on the managing branch
significantly predicted less FA (β = −0.17, p = 0.02). No other
indices predicted total FA rate.
Finally, we found two predictors for the d-prime index: the
perceiving and management branches of the MSCEIT. These
predictors explained 5% of the variance (adjusted R2 = 0.05,
F(2,174) = 5.83, p = 0.004). We found that higher scores on the
perceiving branch significantly predicted higher total d-prime
(β = 0.20, p = 0.008), as did the management branch (β = 0.15,
p = 0.04). No other indices predicted total d-prime rate.
Cool go/no-go Task and EI
Correlational analyses were also conducted for the three EI
instruments using the RT, FA and d-prime variables in the cool
go/no-go task. Significant correlations were found only between
the ‘‘perceiving’’ branch of the MSCEIT and RTs (r = −0.17,
p = 0.02). In this case—and contrary to what we found in the case
of emotional stimuli—participants with higher EI scores took less
time to complete each task.
Cool and Hot go/no-go Task
First, given that both cool and hot go/no-go tasks are designed
to measure the same cognitive processes, we correlated the
total errors, RTs, FAs and d-prime variables between both
tasks, and we only found positive and significant correlations
between cool and hot go/no-go tasks for RT scores (r = 0.50,
p < 0.01). No significant correlations were found for total errors
(r = 08; p = 0.33), FA (r = 14; p = 0.07) and d-prime (r = 14;
p = 0.08). We then conducted paired t-test comparisons to
determine whether or not there were any differences in difficulty
between the tasks; we found significant differences between
all of the variables. Thus, participants made fewer total errors
(t(171) = 23.54, p < 0.01) and had fewer FAs (t(171) = 4.75,
p < 0.01); they spent less time (t(171) = 19.52, p < 0.01);
and they achieved higher d-prime scores (t(171) = −33.44,
p < 0.01) when responding to cool go/no-go tasks (total
error mean [SD]: 3.18 [2.46]; FA mean [SD]: 10.26 [7.93]; RT
mean [SD): 329.32 [60.51]; d-prime mean [SD]: 5.17 [1.06])
than to hot go/no-go tasks (total error mean [SD]: 13.62
[5.46]; FA mean [SD]: 13.92 [7.50]; RT mean [SD]: 446.68
[89.48]; d-prime mean [SD]: 2.34 [0.51]) These results are
indicative of the higher level of difficulty of hot cognitive tasks
compared with cold cognitive tasks, which is unsurprising (see
Figures 6–9).
DISCUSSION
The present study analyzed the relationship between the three EI
models and cognitive control abilities. In order to measure EI, we
employed a performance-based ability model, a self-report ability
model, and a self-report mixed model instrument. For assessing
cognitive control, we utilized go/no-go tasks with emotional
(hot) and non-emotional (cool) stimuli.
When we focused on the hot go/no-go task, we found
a positive correlation between the managing branch of the
MSCEIT and the RT index for the majority of the conditions
(exceptions were the fearful go and happy go stimuli) and
with the stress-management branch of the EQi-S for the sad
go condition. In contrast, we found, for RT scores, a negative
correlation between the repair dimension of the TMMS (angry
go, sad no-go and overall neutral go) and the interpersonal
dimension of the EQi-S (angry go, sad go and emotional
go). With both self-report tasks, however, this correlation was
only significant in three of the ten analyzed conditions, and
was therefore not particularly consistent throughout the test
blocks. In addition, multiple regression analyses support the
correlational results for the managing and repair scales. These
results show that higher-EI participants, as measured through
the MSCEIT, took more time to respond to the go stimuli, thus
suggesting that in these participants there is deeper processing of
the facial expressions compared with their lower-EI counterparts.
Given that the aim of the task was to focus not on the speed
of the response but rather on its accuracy, taking longer to
process each face would appear to be an adaptive strategy that
allows the individual more time to choose the correct response.
With the repair scale of the TMMS, in contrast, participants
who perceived themselves as having higher EI had shorter RTs
than those who perceived themselves as having lower EI. This
result could be taken to imply that perceptions about one’s own
EI ability are related to a less reflexive strategy in the cognitive
task.
For our cognitive control index, with respect to the
predictions of our hypothesis, we found that higher EI (primarily
for the managing branch), measured with the MSCEIT, was
related to lower FA rates (exceptions included fearful and sad
go and fearful no-go stimuli). In addition, higher FA rates
were related to lower scores in the stress-management scale
of the EQi-S, but only for the happy and sad go stimuli
and for the fearful no-go stimulus conditions. Finally, with
the TMMS, higher scores on the attention scale were related
to higher FA rates when a sad face was the go stimulus.
Multiple regressions only identified the managing branch as the
predictor variable for the total FA rate. As we hypothesized,
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FIGURE 6 | Cool and hot go/no-go total errors.
the results with the MSCEIT were thus more consistent;
using the performance-based ability model, higher EI was
found to be particularly beneficial to controlling incorrect
responses. This result supports our previous suggestion that a
slower response could be a better strategy for achieving the
goal of the task. In other words, higher-EI participants were
slower but more accurate, which matched the aim of their
task.
Nonetheless, it is important to adequately understand this
result, which led us to question of whether the lower-EI
participants’ poorer performance on the FA index was due
to poorer cognitive control ability or whether this could
be a consequence of an additional mechanism involving a
deficit in the perception of the stimuli. To this end, we
examined the d-prime index, which showed a positive correlation
with the managing branch of the MSCEIT when the go
stimulus was an angry face and a positive correlation with
FIGURE 7 | Cool and hot go/no-go FAs.
FIGURE 8 | Cool and hot go/no-go RT.
the managing and perceiving branch of the MSCEIT with
the total d-prime. In addition, multiple regressions revealed
how the perceiving and managing branch of the MSCEIT
predict the total d-prime, suggesting that higher-EI participants
showed better discrimination under these conditions. Thus,
the superior performance of these participants could be due
to their greater ability to discriminate between the stimuli,
along with an enhanced cognitive control capacity; the fact
that for the remainder of the blocks, the FA scores were
higher suggests better cognitive control ability—but not better
discriminative ability—under these conditions. In addition,
these analyses showed how the total d-prime score was more
strongly predicted by the MSCEIT perceiving branch than
the managing branch. This finding is unsurprising, given that
the d-prime index is a measure of the ability to discriminate
FIGURE 9 | Cool and hot go/no-go D-prime.
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between stimuli. Thus, those participants with higher scores
on the perceiving branch of the MSCEIT discriminate better
than those with lower scores, a finding that also gives validity
to the MSCEIT scale. In the case of the EQi-S, the lower
FA rates for the higher stress-management participants in
the fearful no-go condition may also be explained by their
superior ability to discriminate the facial expressions, given the
participants’ higher scores on the d-prime index under these
conditions.
These results contribute towards confirming the validity of the
performance-based ability model. Those individuals in our study
who adequately managed their emotions presented consistently
better cognitive control capabilities in an emotional context
than those without such emotional management abilities. Our
results are consistent with previous studies that have measured
related cognitive control abilities with emotional stimuli. These
studies also found that MSCEIT was negatively correlated
with a Stroop task index (Martin and Thomas, 2011; Checa
and Fernández-Berrocal, 2015). Further, Casey et al. (2011)
demonstrated how pre-school individuals who showed difficulty
in delaying gratifications, performed more poorly in a hot
go/no-Go task than those who showed higher levels of delayed
gratification (up to a period of 40 years). These findings support
the hypothesis that the emotion-regulation branch within the
Mayer and Salovey (1997) model of EI is likely to play a
central role in determining personal and social success, since
it entails awareness of the most effective strategies for creating
adapted responses in novel emotional situations (Côté, 2014;
Cabello and Fernández-Berrocal, 2015b; Peña-Sarrionandia et al.,
2015).
Some researchers have also demonstrated that EI and
cognitive control appear to be related to frontal brain regions.
For instance, Krueger et al. (2009), using the MSCEIT, showed
how ‘‘ability EI’’ depends on different regions of the prefrontal
cortex (PFC). In particular, the ventromedial PFC appears to be
related to the understanding and managing EI branches, while
the dorsolateral PFC is related to the perception of emotions.
In addition, Jausovec et al. (2001) demonstrated that low-EI
individuals showed low activity in the left frontal cortex. Several
studies have also related cognitive control to the frontal cortex
(Miller, 2000; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Rushworth et al., 2004;
Tang et al., 2016). Thus, cognitive control appears to sequentially
activate various frontal regions, such as the dorsolateral PFC, the
medial frontal cortex, and the orbitofrontal PFC (Tang et al.,
2016).
When we focused on cool go/no-go tasks in our study,
we only found differences between performance-based ability
EI and the RT index. In this case, higher scores on the
‘‘perceiving’’ branch of the EI instrument were correlated with
shorter RTs. The fact that the higher-EI participants displayed
faster responses in this neutral task (in contrast with their
slower responses during hot tasks) could be due to the relatively
simple nature of the stimuli (red and green circles), which
may not require the same depth of processing as the facial
expressions that were used in the hot go/no-go tasks. For the
FA and d-prime indices, as we hypothesized, no differences were
found when the stimuli were neutral, thus suggesting better
performance for higher-EI individuals only when the stimuli are
emotionally laden, a finding that is consistent with the results
reported by Gutiérrez-Cobo et al. (2016). This result, however,
could be open to an alternative explanation. In particular,
when analyzing the difficulty of the cool and hot tasks, we
found the hot task to be significantly more challenging (total
error percentage of 13.62%) than the cool task (total error
percentage of 3.18%), which is also consistent with previous
studies (Schulz et al., 2007). Given its relative lack of complexity,
the cool go/no-go task could thus be insensitive to individual
differences.
EI has been shown to have a beneficial effect during
stressful situations (Slaski and Cartwright, 2003; Schneider et al.,
2013; Extremera and Rey, 2015; Limonero et al., 2015; Peña-
Sarrionandia et al., 2015). The hot go/no-go task could be
regarded as analogous to a real-life stress situation, and in
particularly stressful contexts, high EI would favor the liberation
of working memory and attentional resources in order to
adequately cope with the stressful situation, thus reducing (in
this case) the incidence of FAs. Future researchers should
analyze whether the differences between EI and cognitive control
in hot and cool cognitive tasks are due to this emotional
context or to the complexity of the tasks. In addition, it
could be worthwhile to explore the effects of EI on working
memory load capacity. Although cool and hot cognitive tasks
are designed to measure the same cognitive processes (Schulz
et al., 2007), the present study only found correlations in
the RT index, which may be due to the fact that these
tasks do not actually measure the same process or, again,
because of the differences in complexity between the different
tasks.
In addition, our results suggest that an improvement in
the ability to manage emotions may enhance the capacity for
cognitive control. Given the fact that a lack of cognitive control
can have negative consequences for certain behaviors such as
impulsiveness, drug abuse, or over-consumption (Aichert et al.,
2012; Volkow et al., 2013; Holmes et al., 2016) this emotional
management could help to control these undesirable behaviors,
through the higher ability to control prepotent and unpleasant
behaviors in critical situations. It is important to consider this
clinical aspect due to the long-term relevance of the cognitive
control ability (Casey et al., 2011).
It is also important to note that although the three instruments
employed for measuring EI are designed to cover the EI
construct, the correlations that we found between the MSCEIT
and the TMMS and EQi-S were all very low (all r < 0.20),
which was found to be the case for all of the scales. The
strongest correlations were between the two self-report measures
(from 0.25 to 0.43), which could possibly reflect the subjective
nature of both tests; in particular, these correlations could
have been inflated by common-method variance (Goldenberg
et al., 2006; Webb et al., 2013; Cabello and Fernández-
Berrocal, 2015a). Future researchers should pay attention to this
important issue when choosing to employ the EI model in their
studies.
A further issue concerns the results obtained for the hot
go/no-go task. Statistical analyses showed that this task is suitable
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for measuring differences between emotions in the several
indices employed. Overall, we discovered that fearful faces were
those with higher RTs and FA, and lower d-prime score, in
contrast to happy faces presenting the lower RT and FA, as well as
the higher d-prime scores. It is important to mention that some
of the effect sizes are rather small, such as the FA and d-prime
interactions (0.02 and 0.03, respectively). However, these results
are consistent with Tottenham et al. (2011) who found similar
effects. It is possible that higher effect sizes make it easier to find
stronger correlations between this task and the EI scales.
There are four important limitations related to the sample
used in the present study. First, our results were obtained using
an unrepresentative sample, given that it was composed of
undergraduate students whose EI scores are susceptible to slight
variations, and it is therefore possible that their performance
is not representative of that of the general population. Second,
our sample was predominantly composed of females, with only
25% of the participants being male. It is thus possible that
gender differences could have had an impact on the EI scores
(and therefore on the validity of our results and conclusions;
Cabello et al., 2016). Third, we have not assessed if participants
have suffered any neurological or psychiatric disorder and drug
or alcohol abuse. Finally, interpreting the correlational analyses
requires some caution due to multiple comparisons.
The go/no-go task is a well-known measure that has
been employed in numerous studies. To the best of our
knowledge, however, the current study is the first to examine
the relationship between the go/no-go task and the EI
construct. The present work has shown that higher-EI
participants—measured primarily with the performance-
based ability model instrument MSCEIT—demonstrated
better cognitive control in hot go/no-go tasks in comparison
with a cool version of the cognitive task. The results for the
self-report measures of EI were less consistent across the
conditions, although they did display some correlations with
the cognitive control index, thus suggesting better performance
for higher-EI individuals. Future research should focus on
a more in-depth analysis of the relationship between the
go/no-go task and the EI construct by using event-related
potential measures that would provide more information
about the mechanisms underlying the various cognitive control
processes.
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